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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Under applicable law determining river-designated bound-
ary lines between counties, did defendant prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the subject property was located north of the 
Weber River (i.e., in Weber County) on January 10, 1866. 
2. In any event, is defendant precluded by estoppel from 
denying the Davis County source of its claimed title to the subject 
property. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiffs Baxter appeal from a Judgment entered in this 
matter purporting to quiet title to a six-acre tract of land in 
defendant Utah Department of Transportation. In their Complaint, 
plaintiffs set forth a Davis County Tax Deed as the basis for 
seeking to have title quieted in their names; defendant responded 
with an Answer containing an Affirmative Defense which asserted 
that the subject property was located in Weber County and that 
Davis County had no authority to levy taxes thereon. 
The dispute in this litigation involves a determination of 
whether the subject six-acre tract of land was located in Davis 
County or in Weber County when their common boundary line was 
established on January 10, 1866. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court, 
A non-jury trial was held before Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, 
on August 26-27, 1986. Judgment was entered on October 6, 1986. 
Notice of Appeal was filed and entered on November 4, 1986. 
Plaintiffs by this appeal seek to have the Judgment reversed and to 
have title to the subject property quieted in themselves. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On May 26, 1969, plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, together with 
Ronald Toone and Thomas Hollberg, purchased an 18-acre tract of 
land at tax sale from Davis County, each acquiring an undivided 
one-third interest as tenants-in-common. Theland was described as--
Sk of N^ of the SW% of Sec. 25, 5N, 1W, SLM, 
cont. 18.00 Acres in Davis County, 
Serial No. S.W. 3 (Exh. P-2) 
In 1970, they divided the 18 acres by quit claim deeds, result-
ing in plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as flBaxtersM) acquiring 
the six-acre tract which is the subject of this litigation (Exhs. 
P-3, P-4 and P-5; R. 411 -413). 
The chain of title to the 18-acre tract reveals that Tasma P. 
Dansie filed a quiet title action in the Second District Court of 
Weber County , and in 1946 she secured a Decree quieting title to 
various lands, separately described as being in either Weber or 
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Davis County. The l8-acre tract was specifically described in the 
Decree as being in Davis County(R.405-406). On March 10, 1961, 
Tasma P. Dansie conveyed the 18-acre tract to Robert Rees Dansie and 
his wife, but the document was not recorded until April 13, 1964 
(R. 409). 
On May 14, 1964, Robert Rees Dansie and his wife conveyed the 
subject property (and other lands) to State Road Commission of 
Utah, predecessor to defendant Utah Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter referred to as ffUD0TM), which prepared the Warranty 
Deed. However, that document departed from prior conveyances in the 
chain of title and recited for the first time that the subject property 
was located in Weber County (Exh.D-23). When the Davis County Recorder 
refused to record the deed so as to show the subject property being 
in Davis County, counsel for UDOT erased "Weber County" and substituted 
"Davis County" on the document, and it was recorded on March 31, 1975 
(Exh. P-12). 
All of the referenced title documents were duly recorded in the 
Recorder's office in Davis County. 
Because record title to the subject property was in the name of 
Tasma P. Dansie on January 1, 1964, the failure of anyone to pay 1964 
real property taxes resulted in the 1969 Davis County tax sale. 
During the early spring of 1978, respondent and/or its con-
tractor entered upon the subject property for the purpose of re-
moving gravel-type materials, whereupon appellants filed a Notice of 
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Claim pursuant to Section 63-30-6, Utah Code Annotated (as Amended 
1^65), seeking to quiet title to the subject property. No action was 
taken on the claim, and the Complaint in this matter was filed in 
the Second District Court in and for Davis County in 1979 (R.l-5). 
Baxters pleaded the Davis County Tax Deed in their Complaint as 
the basis for quiet title relief. UDOT then filed its Answer con-
taining a general denial and, in addition and by way of defense, 
affirmatively alleged that the subject property was located in Weber 
County (R. 62-66). 
UDOT in furtherance of its affirmative defense, filed a motion 
ir^  the Second District Court of Davis County to have the matter re-
moved tu the Second District Court of Weber County. Judge Douglas 
Cornaby transferred the case since the subject property at the time 
of his Order (R. 33-35) was located on the north side of the Weber 
River, ostensibly providing a jurisdictional basis for Weber County 
court proceedings on the issue of the boundary line between the two 
c^untieb. 
Respondent then moved for Summary Judgment before Judge Calvin 
Gould in the Second District Court of Weber County, contending that 
(among other things) appellants were collaterally estopped from 
bringing this action because plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter appeared as 
an expert witness in a gravel-removal case between Ronald L. Toone 
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and Johnson Construction Company involving an adjoining property. 
Judge Gould ruled in favor of UDOT, and Summary Judgment was entered 
on March 3, 1983-- together with a subsequent Final Order entered on 
or before April 9, 1983, purporting to quiet title to the subject 
property in UDOT. Plaintiffs appealed the Summary Judgment and 
Final Order to this Court. 
On August 26, 1985, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
reversed (Case No. 19097, cited as 705 P. 2d 1167), and the case 
was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
A Pretrial hearing was held before Judge David Roth on August 
4, 1986 (Exh. P-20 , which is a complete transcript of the Pretrial 
hearing on that date) subsequent to his Ruling denying UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment based upon an 1894 survey of the then-location 
of the Weber River-- which UDOT asserted to be the boundary line be-
tween the two counties-- and he held that the boundary between Weber 
and Davis counties was established by the legislature of the Territory 
of Utah as the main channel of the Weber River in the area of the sub-
juect property as it existed when the two counties were created in 
1866 (R.456-458, and Exh. P-20 at pp. 38-43). 
Judge Roth adopted his written Ruling on Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated May 21, 1896, as supplemented at his direction with 
portions of the Pretrial transcript (Exh. P-20 at p.40; and Addenda 
I and II) as the Pretrial Order, holding that the issues set for trial 
were to be decided by determining whether the subject property, as of 
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1866, was locu^ed on the south (i.e., Davis County) side or the 
north (i.e., Weber County) side of the main channel of the Weber 
River. 
In addition, and as a further supplement to the Pretrial pro-
ceedings, Judge Roth ruled in a Memorandum Decision that UDOT, by 
reason of its Affirmative Defense to the Complaint, had the burden of 
proving that the subject property was located in Weber County in 1866. 
The matter went to trial on August 26, 1986, before Ronald 0. 
Hyde, District Judge, sitting without a jury. The uncontradicted 
evidence established that, as of January 10, 1866, when the boundary 
line between the two counties was established, the subject property 
wac located on the south (i.ec, Davis County) side of the Weber 
River and that not a trickle of the Weber River waters flowed on the 
south side of the subject property. However, taking a position contrary 
to Judge Roth's Pretrial rulings, Judge Hyde found that the "exact" 
location of the Weber River in the general area of the subject prop-
erty could not be determined, that the present county surveyors and 
engineers were unable to furnish a "description" of the riverfs 
location in 1866-- there being no survey of the river location prior 
to 1894-- and that the boundary line between the two counties should 
therefore be established in the location where the Weber River was 
flowing in 1894 (and where it is flowing today) in accordance with 
the 1894 survey (R. 485, and Addendum III). 
Further, and again proceeding contrary to Judge Rothfs Mem-
orandum Decision supplementing his Pretrial rulings, Judge Hyde held 
that plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the subject property was located in Davis County as of 1866 
(R. 485; and see Addenda III and IV). 
Official U.S. Surveyor General surveys which were run in 
the years 1855, 1871 and 1886 placed the main channel of the Weber 
River as it flowed from east to west to where it crossed the west 
(i.e.,north-south) line of Section 25 at a point a few hundred feet 
northwest of the subject property to be 34.5 chains(2,277 feet) north 
of the southwest corner of Section 25 (Exhs. P-1,P-15, P-16 and P-17; 
and Exhs« D-14, D-15, and D-16). Subsequent to 1886, and prior to 
1894, a sudden change in the river resulted in the channel being located 
on the south side of the subject property, crossing the west line of 
Section 25 at a point only 715 feet north of the southwest corner of 
25-- an avulsive shift of 1,562 feet (Exh. P-l; and Exhs. D-2, D-4, 
D-5, D-12, D-17, D-18, D-19, D-20 and D-21). 
Judge Hyde thereupon ruled consistent with UDOTfs contentions 
that there was no prior survey which described the location of the 
Weber River east of the section line by metes-and-bounds and adopted 
the metes-and-bounds description made by the surveyors of the res-
pective counties in 1894 as being the 1866 boundary line between the 
two counties. Judgment was entered for respondent UDOT upon the basis 
that the subject property was and is located in Weber County (R*521, 
and Addenda IV and V— Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower courtfs findings relative to the location of the 
Weber River in 1866 are clearly erroneous and contrary to the evi-
dence, and they are insufficient and inadequate in that they fail 
to address the primary issue in this case as framed at Pretrial--
and which coirports to law-- to-wit: Where was the location of the 
Weber River in 1866 in relation to the subject property; that since 
the evidence conclusively established that the subject property was 
located south of the Weber River in 1866-- and absent a necessary 
contrary finding-- the Judgment must fail for lack of both factual 
and legal support. 
Furthermore, since UDOT asserted that the subject property was 
located in Weber County by way of Affirmative Defense to the Complaint, 
Judge Roth made an additional Pretrial ruling that the burden of 
proving that the subject property was located in Weber County in 1866 
was upon defendant UDOT; that UDOT failed to meet its burden, and made 
no attempt to do so, and even if the findings of the lower court be 
taken at face value, they contradict and destroy the type of proof 
necessary to support UDOTfs burden in this case. 
That UDOTfs attempt to establish the location of the Weber River 
( and the common boundary line between the two counties) at its 
location south of the subject property, where it was flowing in 1894, 
must fail. Although contended by UDOT, and adopted by the trial court, 
that an 1894 courses-and-distances survey of the meandering 
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Weber River in the area of the subject property was made pursuant 
to a statute providing for a resolution of boundary-line disputes 
between counties, the survey failed to do so because (a) it was a 
first-time survey made by the county surveyors at the instigation 
of Davis County for the purpose of preparing a county-wide map which 
would show major physical features, (b) the surveyors did not erect 
monuments along the river in the area of the subject property, (c) 
the surveyors made no attempt to take into account the sudden and 
substantial (avulsive) channel change due to natural or man-made 
events which occurred between 1886-1894 and caused it to abandon 
its old channel, (d) neither county subsequently ratified or 
accepted the survey as establishing the common boundary, (e) there 
was and is no evidence that the 1894 survey was made for the purpose 
of resolving a disputed or uncertain boundary line (as mandated by 
the statute), and (f), in any event, the survey did not attempt to 
locate the location of the Weber River boundary ffas0o. now establish 
ed by lawn ( i.e., as of 1666). 
Finally, as bearing on the county-situs of the subject property 
and as establishing a separate and independent basis for reversal, 
recitals in the chain of title to the subject property all placed 
the land in Davis County, until the chain was first broken by 
Dansiefs deed to UDOT in 1964 wherein the situs was recited as being 
in Weber County-- the event which gave rise to this litigation; 
therefore, by reason of the doctrine of estoppel by deed, which 
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prohibits contesting claimants from denying material recitals in 
conveyances from a common-source grantor, UDOT is estopped from 
denying that the subject property is in Davis County. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
TIIE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT, AS OF JANUARY 10, 
1866 AND UNTIL AT LEAST 1886, THE ENTIRE FLOW OF THE WEBER RIVER WAS 
NCKTIi OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, THEREBY PLACING IT IN DAVIS COUNTY. 
The boundary line between Weber and Davis Counties was 
established by the location of the Weber River as of January 10, 
1866, as set forth in Compiled Laws of Utah of 1876, Sections 156 
and 157, and thereafter adopted by Article XI,Section 1 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah: 
"( 156) Sec. 14. 
... a line running east from a point (on the eastern 
shore of the Great Salt Lake) to a point in the centre 
of the channel of the Weber River due north from the 
northwest corner of Kingston's Fort, thence up the 
centre of said channel to a point opposite the summit 
of the Wasatch Mountains ,. . . " 
Critical to an analysis of the location of the Weber River 
in 1866 is the fact that this is not a lawsuit between Davis and 
Weber Counties seeking to establish the location of the Weber 
River for some extended distance for general county purposes* Rather, 
this litigation involves a dispute between what in effect constit-
utes two private litigants, each claiming title to a six-acre tract 
of land. The foregoing distinction brings to the fore two entirely 
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different approaches to the problem made by Judge Roth, who 
conducted the Pre-trial, and Judge Hyde, who .tried the case. 
The central theme adopted by Judge Hyde in his Memorandum 
Decision and his Findings of Fact was that "an exact location of 
river in 1866 cannot be placed,11 and that there was Man uncertainty 
as to the location of the river" inasmuch as official U. S. Surveys 
of the river location along the west line of Section 25 "did not 
describe the location of the river east of the section line," and 
that, therefore and because no prior surveys of the river had ever 
been made, an 1894 survey of the then-existing channel of the Weber 
River made by the surveyors of the two counties established the 
boundary line between the two counties. 
On the other hand, Judge Roth ruled at Pretrial (Exh. P-20 at 
pp. 38 and 43) and in his Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 456), adopted by him as a portion of his Pretrial Order ( Exh. 
P-20, p. 40), that the issue involved a determination of whether 
the Weber River in 1866 was located north or south of the subject 
property. 
Baxters prepared their case and presented evidence at trial 
in accordance with Judge Rothfs Pretrial rulings, proving that the 
Weber River was located north of the subject property in 1866. UDOT 
disregarded the three-part Pretrial Order and presented evidence at 
trial along lines adopted by Judge Hyde in his Memorandum Decision 
and Findings of Fact. It should be noted that Judge Hyde avoided any 
reference to the 1866 river location in relation to the subject property 
The U.S. Surveyor General conducted official surveys of the 
west (i.e., north-south)line of Section 25 in 1855, 1871 and 1886 
(Exhs. P-15, P-16 and P-17). The field notes of the surveys care-
fully delineated every physical feature along the survey route, in-
cluding each watercourse encountered. The 1855 survey showed a small 
river channel only .40 chains (26 feet) wide at a point 22.60 chains 
north of the SW corner of Section 25. At 32.70 chains the river was 
encountered again, after crossing an "island," and the river was crossed 
at 34.50 chains--!.80 chains (118 ft.) wide (Exh. P-16). 
The 1871 and 1886 surveys also encountered the small channel, 
but the field notes designated it as an "old river bed." Signifi-
cantly, the largest river channel was again found at 34o50 chains 
(1871) and 34.75 chains (1886)--Exh. P-l, reproduced on opposite 
page. 
(See Addendum VI for excerpts from U.S. Survey field notes) 
In addition to the field notes, the U. S. Surveys were accompa-
nied by maps prepared by the surveyors which showed the location 
of prominent physical features in the area. For instance, in 1855--
just eight years after Utah was first settled-- the location of 
the river channel as it coursed from east to west across Section 25 
was plotted, as well as adjacent mountains. And in 1871-- just two 
years after the transcontinental railroad ran down Weber 
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1 EXHIBIT P-rl — U. S. Surveys 
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Canyon-- the surveyors plotted the location of the river in re-
lation to the U.P.R.R., minor streams, the east-west quarter 
section line, adjacent mountains and existing roads (See Exhs. 
D-14 and D-15, reproduced at pp. 14 and 15, and Exh. D-16, re-
produced in Addendum VII) 
Although Judge Hyde felt the location of the Weber River to 
the east of the west line of Section 25 was not described, it is 
submitted that, for the purpose of locating a boundary line between 
two counties which is designated as a river-- subject to ordinary 
minor sidewise movements (i.e>, relictions and accretions)-- the 
surveys and maps were the very best evidence available under the 
circumstances. It should be noted that the survey maps were certi-
fied by the Surveyor General of Utah as being "strictly conform-
able to the field notes11 of the surveys. 
The Weber River flowed across the SW% prior to 1894 against 
and below the hillside, and substantially parallel to the U.P.R.R. 
tracks. In addition to the U.S.Surveys, a private map prepared in 
1890 (Exh. P-6) by the "Wyoming and Western Railway11 and filed in 
the book of Private Surveys of Davis County, shows the Weber River 
in the same location where placed by the U.S. Surveys, as well as 
the location of Kingstons Fort. 
The pre-1894 river channel across the SW% of Section 25 has 
always been marked by a distinct row of large trees, as marked on 
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the 1871 U.S. Survey Map and on all of the aerial photos: Exh. 
D-17 (1937), Exh. D-19 (1946), Exh. D-18(1952),E*hs. D-20 and P-l 
(1958) and Exh. D-21(1965). The line of trees shown on the U. S. 
Surveys and on all aerial photos coincide with the Weber River 
location in 1855, 1871 and 1886. The line of trees exists today, 
showing the old-channel location in clear detail. 
If the exact location of the Weber River in the general area 
had been contemplated by the territorial legislature, it easily 
could have adopted a line which could have been, or which then 
was, determined by reference to the U.S. Survey that had been com-
pleted in the area. See San Juan County v. Grand County (1962), 
13 Utah 2d 242. 
UDOT contended that there was no "main channel11 of the Weber 
River prior to 1894 (Exh. P-20 at p.23), but the facts and law are 
otherwise. All three U.S. Surveys found a small river channel at 
approximately 25.0 chains north of the SW corner of Section 25--
only 26 feet wide and dry in 1871 and 1886. On the other hand, all 
three surveys encountered the main channel of the Weber River 
at 34.5 to 34.75 chains north of the Section corner-- a river 
1.25 to 1.50 chains (82 ft. to 100 ft.) wide and flowing between 
2\ and 3 feet deep. 
Main Channel 
That bed of the river over which the principal volume 
of water flows. Many great rivers discharge themselves 
into the sea through more than one channel. They all, 
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however, have a main channel. Packet Co. v. Bridge 
Co. ( C.C.) 31 F.757. Compare State of Oklahoma v. 
State of Texas, 258 U.S.574, 42 S. Ct. 406, 414, 
66 L. Ed. 771. 
Black1s law Dictionary, Third Edition, 
pp. 308-309 
It is difficult to define the 'main channel1 of a river 
with precision, but it is sufficient to say that it is 
that bed of a river over which the principal volume of 
water flows... 
Words and Phrases, Vol.26, p.62 
Of even greater significance, however, the location of the 
subject property, as superimposed in red on Exhs. D-14, D-15 and 
D-16, is located south of the entire Weber River system as it ex-
isted in 1866, thereby making any issue as to what channel may 
have been the main channel a moot issue and clearly establishing 
the location of the subject property as being in Davis County in 
1866. 
The oldest Davis County Assessors Plat Map of Section 25 
shows the old river location in substantially the same location as 
set forth in the three U. S. Surveys and maps. The subject property 
(marked with a red arrow) was then owned by Tasma Dansie, and it 
was located south of the Weber River— in Davis County. (See Exh.P-7 
reproduced on opposite page. 
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SW£ of Section 2£ 
EXHIBIT P— ? 
Taken from "Assessors Plat Maps" book of Tp* U~3> N, R. 1 W. 
Davis County Recorder's Office 
• The location of the Y-eber River is shown as it existed prior to 
the channel change *vhich occurred between 1886 and 189U# 
Arrovf indicates location of subject property—superimposed 
on the E>chibit# 
#
 Coloration appears on original Bchibit. 
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The surveyors and engineers who testified at trial all 
agreed on examination by plaintiffs1 counsel that no portion of 
the WeberRiver waters were flowing on the south side of the subject 
property in 1866: 
UDOTfs witness Max B. Elliott, Davis County Surveyor --
C. But in any event, you found the river up near that area 
in all three years, didn't you? 
A. Found it further north than it is on that map, that's 
correct. 
Q. My other question, in any of the surveys conducted by the 
United States Surveyor General, in either 1855, 1871 or 
1866, didyou find in any of those surveys, any water of 
the Weber River located south of the Baxter tract shown 
on Exhibit PI? 
A. Not on those notes. 
Q. Not a drop of water to the south, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. All of the Weber River water shown was somewhere to the 
north of the Baxter tract, wasn't it? 
A. On those notes, that's correct. 
Q. On those notes. And until 1894, you found no indication 
of water south of the tract until that '94 survey came 
about, did you? 
A. I found nothing on that prior to the 1894 survey, that's 
correct. 
(Tr. 27-28— R. 580-581) 
UDOT's witness John P. Reeve, Weber County Surveyor--
C. But you didn't find any water as of 1855 or 1871 flowing 
on the south of this property, did you? 
A
-
 No
- (Tr. 76 --R. 629) 
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UDOT's witness Jack L. DeMass, an engineer and surveyor--
Q. All right. As to Exhibit 9, which is this chart that has 
been prepared-- I think you've stated this was your work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if I read the chart correctly and relate it to 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, the chart does not indicate in any 
respect that the Weber River water or any portion of it 
was flowing south of the subject property at least through 
1886? 
A. If I can clarify that. None was flowing there during the 
two weeks in October when they made the survey. 
C. Yes. 
A. Not to say that it wasn't there during the year. I did not 
agree with that. 
Q. All right. Did you find anything in the Surveyor General's 
notes to indicate that there were old channels south of the 
channel located some 22 chains north of the section corner 
of this southwest corner? 
A. No. 
Q. No channels were indicated, were they? 
A. No. 
(Tr. 93-94"R. 646-647) 
Plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, an engineer and surveyor--
0. fbw some general questions. On the three surveys that you 
ran or that the government ran, excuse me, and that you 
plotted, didyou find any river indication that was common 
to all three surveys? 
A. Yes. The area at approximately 34 and a half chains showed 
the main channel of the Weber River on all three surveys 
with slight variance. 
(Tr. 156-157-R-709-710) 
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Q. Now, as you have reviewed the survey notes for all three 
years, was there any indication up through 1886, that 
there was any portion of the Weber River at a point roughly 
715 feet north of the southwest quarter of section 25? 
A. No, there was no river in that location at that time. 
C. None at all? 
A. None. 
0. Do the notes in any respect reveal from a point south 
of 22.6 chains north of the section corner, any old 
river channel between there and the southwest quarter 
of the section? 
A. None. (Tr. 158 -- R# 711) 
THE WITNESS: Yes. From all I can determine from the notes, 
the main channel of the Weber River was approximately 
600 feet north of the subject property. 
C. ( BY MR. FULLER) And that's on a due north/south bearing? 
A. Yes. (Tr.166-- R. 719) 
Although there was no legal description showing the exact 
location of the Weber River where it flowed in 1866, and while 
the surveyors disagreed as to which of three river channels con-
stituted the main channel of the river in 1866, on the critical 
issue in the case there was no disagreement: All three river 
channels were flowing on the north side of the subject property 
in 1866. 
There is no evidence in this case which even suggests that 
any portion of the waters of the Weber River flowed anywhere but 
on the north side of the subject property in 1866. 
.oo. 
Two Utah cases have addressed the issue of disputed county 
lines where not tied to the U. S. survey system. In the case of 
Barton v. Sanpete County (1916), 49 U. 188, 162 P. 611, the terri-
torial legislature tied the division line between Juab and Sanpete 
Counties in the area of Barton's lands to "a point east of the place 
where the Gunnison road crosses the divide between Chicken creek 
and Sevier river; then in a straight line southwesterly to the upper 
bluff rocks at the south end of Cedar Ridge.ff 
As anyone knowledgeable about legal descriptions would recog-
nize, and as was noted in the decision, the description was fatally 
flawed since there was no way of fixing the location of the !,point,! 
which was east of where the Gunnison road crossed the divide. 
The State Engineer tried to establish the boundary-line where 
he "thought11 it should be according to the procedure for resolving 
disputes provided by state statute, but the matter eventually was 
placed before the Utah legislature, which amended the boundary-line 
description. When the matter finally reached the Utah Supreme Court, 
it was held that the original boundary line was "a floating, or, to 
be more exact, an unidentified11 boundary, and that the legislature 
acted properly in the circumstances: 
...The legal effect of what was done by the Legislature 
was merely to determine and fix the originally contemplated 
territorial limits of the two counties. No territory was 
therefore annexed to one or stricken from the other county, 
and hence the constitutional provision has no application 
here. 
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The Barton case was critically analyzed and its ruling strictly 
limited to the facts of that case in Summit County v. Rich County 
( 1921), 57 U. 553, 195 P.639. In the Summit County case the county-
boundary description where it followed the Union Pacific Railroad 
was claimed to be indefinite, and the matter thereupon was placed 
before the Utah legislature, which proceeded to establish a boundary 
line. 
In holding the legislative action unconstitutional, the Utah 
Supreme Court made the following observations and rulings: 
... If it had appeared in the Barton Case, upon a comparison 
of the original boundary line, with the boundary line estab-
lished by the Legislature in 1913, that the Legislature had 
manifestly ignored a plain indubitable line marked by a 
transcontinental railroad for a distance of approximately 
four miles, thereby shifting the railroad from one county to 
another, together with thousands of acres of lands and their 
inhabitants, the writer is of the opinion that the court would 
have held that the act was unconstitutional and void.... 
P. 643 
andj 
We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that the 
Legislature which originally defined the boundary line 
between Summit and Rich counties, according to the complaint, 
manifestly intended that the north side of the Union Pacific 
Railroad should constitute the boundary line between the 
two counties for a distance as above stated of approximately 
four miles... 
P. 644 
Further, and with respect to establishing exact descriptions 
of all boundaries such as could be ascertained by engineering skill, 
the Court observed: 
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It is not our province on this appeal to determine, or 
attempt to determine, the exact location of the true 
boundary line at all points between the two counties. 
P. 643 
and, 
The fact that other parts of the boundary line between 
the two counties may be ambiguous or unascertainable by 
engineering skill did not justify the Legislature in 
ignoring altogether that which was clear and unmistak-
able. It was the duty of the Legislature in attempting to 
establish the boundary line to follow the statutory de-
scription as nearly as practicable, and, if it found it 
impracticable to follow it at some particular point, then 
to establish a new line. In doing so, however, it was still 
its duty to be guided by what it conceived to be the 
intention of the Legislature which attempted to'establish 
the original line. 
( Underlining added) 
P. 644 
The North Dakota case of Tavis v. Higgins • (1968), 157 N.W.2d 
718 is similar in many respects to the subject litigation. That 
action, involving two individuals seeking to quiet title to a tract 
of land which was affected by avulsive (sudden) changes over the 
years in the channel of the Missouri River, raised the primary 
issue of the location of the subject land in relation to the 
Missouri River when the two counties were created by the territorial 
legislature in 1873. Disregarding any necessity for exact descript-
ions, and making its ruling binding only "as between the plaintiff 
and defendant,11 that court made the following observations and rulings: 
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It is undisputed that Lot 5 and the South Half of the 
Southeast Quarter ( S%SE%) of Section 18-138-80 was east 
of the main channel of the river, and thus in Burleigh 
County, at the time of the original Government survey in 
1872. 
P. 724 
Where the boundary between two counties is fixed by law 
as the middle of the stream or channel of a river, such 
law must be construed as referring to the channel as it 
existed at the time of passage of the law. An artificial 
or sudden change by avulsion, or otherwise, in the course 
of such stream which defines the boundary between two 
counties, causing a new channel to be formed, does not 
change the boundary. But where such change is gradual and 
imperceptible, the rule is otherwise. 20 C.J.S. Counties 
Sec. 15, p.765 at p.766. 
Therefore, having concluded that the defendants have failed 
to establish that the land claimed by the plaintiffs was 
gradually and imperceptibly accreted to Morton County, we 
construe the boundary between Morton and Burleigh counties 
as fixed by law when such boundary was first established by 
Chapter 18 of the Session Laws of 1872, Dakota Territory. 
P. 726 
... a sudden and avulsive change of the main channel caused 
the property which had so accreted to their Morton County 
property to be suddenly and abruptly cut off from Morton 
County and that, as a result, although such land now is east 
of the main channel, it remains a part of Morton County. The 
fact that most of the accretion was cut off by the new channel 
in 1938 by avulsive action would not change the county of its 
location or ownership. 
P.724 
The evidence at trial fails to support the Findings of Fact 
adopted by the lower court, and, eren if they are supported in part, 
they are insufficient factually and legally to justify the Conclusions 
of taw (which are similarly flawed) for the reason that the evidence 
conclusively established that the subject property was located south 
of the Weber River in 1866. Absent a necessary contrary finding, the 
Judgment must fail for lack of both factual and legal support. 
o^ 
II. 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS LOCATED NORTH OF THE WEBER RIVER (i.e., 
SO AS TO PLACE IT IN WEBER COUNTY) AS OF JANUARY 10, 1866. 
The Complaint in this action pleaded the Davis County tax 
deed as the basis for plaintiffs1 claim that the title to the 
subject property should be quieted in them. Thereupon, UDOT filed 
its Answer setting forth the affirmative defense (among others) 
that the subject property was located in Weber County and that 
therefore the Davis County tax sale was illegal and void. 
At the Pretrial hearing before Judge Roth on August 4, 1986, 
plaintiffs Baxter raised the issue of the burden of proof at trial: 
THE COURT: I will let you know who the burden falls on. 
MR. WARD: It won't make that much difference. All it means 
who has to really proceed first, doesn't it? 
THE COURT:...It is the burden of the party contending, you 
know, to establish those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. 
So I will go through your pleadings and decide where I think the 
burden should be. 
(Exh. P-20 at p.45) 
On August 6, 1986, Judge Roth issued his Memorandum Decision 
placing the burden of proof on UDOT: 
Page 2 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 74206 
Defendant, Utah Department of Transportation alleges, fl affirm-
atively11, that the tax sale was invalid because the property 
-97-
was located in Weber County and that Davis County had no authority 
to either tax or sell the property. The general rule is that the 
burden of proof or persuasion as to a fact or issue rests on the 
party asserting or pleading it. 31A. C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 104, 
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 27. 
Therefore, in this case, the burden of proving the location of the 
property in question lies with the defendant, Utah Department of 
Transportation. 
Dated this 6 day of August, 1986. 
s/d David E. Roth 
David E. Roth, Judge 
( R. 490) 
The previously referenced case of Tavis v. Higgins adopts 
the same rule: 
"... Where a defendant in an action to quiet title claims to 
be the owner of the property and seeks to have title quieted 
in him, he has the burden of proving the allegations of his 
claim and, in effect, becomes a party plaintiff.11 
The same rule is set forth in 12 Am. Jur.2d, Boundaries, Sec. 
99, where it is stated that--
11
 The burden of proof upon an issue as to a boundary is 
upon the party having the affirmative of that issue. This 
burden must generally be established by a preponderance 
of the evidence." 
Assuming, without admitting, that an exact description of the 
location of the Weber River in 1866 cannot be determined at this 
time and that such fact might conceivably defeat one's right to 
prevail in the litigation under different facts and circumstances, 
it is obvious that UD0Tfs evidence presented at trial and its theory 
as to the nature of the proof to be presented have combined to 
completely destroy its case since it failed to prove 
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that the subject property was located in Weber County in 1866. 
Nor can it extricate itself from its own trap by attempting to 
shift its burden to plaintiffs as it attempted to do by side-
stepping the issue in the Conclusions of Law (% 518): 
"3. The plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the Weber changed its course by sudden 
avulsive action, so as to leave the property north of 
the river in Davis County.ff 
( Underlining added) 
As a matter of fact, however, all of the evidence conclu-
sively established that the Weber River was north of the subject 
property in 1866. To have completely changed its course and to 
shift all of its waters to the south side of the subject property 
sometime between the last U.S. Survey in 1886 and the first county 
survey conducted in 1894, whether caused by natural forces or man-
made obstructions, constitutes an avulsive change both as a matter 
of fact and law. The river, which formerly exited Section 25, 
suddenly exited the Section at a point only 715 feet from the SW 
corner-- a deviation of 1,562 feet-- and, in the process, moved from 
the north to the south side of the subject property-- a rectan-
gular parcel of land 826.78 feet long and measuring between 412.88 
feet and approximately 411.29 feet in a north-south direction at 
its respective western and eastern extremities! (See Complaint) 
UDOT has not carried its burden of proving that the subject 
property was located in Weber County in 1866 pursuant to Judge 
Rothfs Pretrial Memorandum Decision. Actually, the Conclusion of 
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of Law heretofore set forth, which was prepared by UDOT and adopted 
by the lower Court, in practical effect admits the location of the 
subject property as being in Davis County (i.e., south of the 
Weber River) in 1866, but UDOT seeks to extricate itself by shifting 
to plaintiffs some undefinable standard of burden of proof. But 
the facts speak for themselves: The distances involved in the 
channel change are avulsive actions, not changes due to accretion 
or reliction. 
11 C.J.S.,Boundaries, Section 34-- Shifting of Channel or Shore 
... the general rule is that where, by a sudden or violent 
change, the channel or shore on which riparian or littoral 
lands are bounded is shifted, the boundaries of such lands 
are unaffected, and remain in their original position;...t! 
72 Am. Jur. 2d^  States, Etc., Sec. 27. Changes in channel as 
affecting boundary. 
The effect upon boundaries of a state, where such bound-
aries are fixed by the middle of the main channel of a 
river, by the changes in that channel through processes 
of accretion and avulsion, is dependent upon the gradual-
ness or suddenness of the change; when the course of the 
river and its channel changes gradually, the boundary 
follows the channel, but if the river suddenly changes its 
course or deserts its natural channel, the boundary remains 
where it was before, that is, in the middle of the altered 
or deserted riverbed. And the fact that the former 
channel may have ceased to be navigable does not change the 
rule. In fixing the boundary along a main navigable channel 
which has been left dry by avulsion, all that is required is 
such certainty as is reasonable as a practical matter, having 
regard to the circumstances.11 
78 Am. Jur. 2dyWaters, Sec. 411.Generally. 
"... But where the change takes place suddenly and percept-
ibly either by reliction or avulsion, as where a stream from 
any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such 
change works no change of boundary or ownership. Title to 
land is not lost even temporarily by avulsion. 
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In most jurisdictions, the character of the stream or body 
of water as tidal, nontidal, navigable or nonnavigable is 
immaterial as respects the application of the foregoing 
rules relating to accretion, reliction, erosion, and 
avulsion. As elsewhere observed, however, in some civil-law 
jurisdictions the application of such rules is limited to 
streams.11 
See also: Quote from 20 C.J.S., Counties, Sec.15, taken 
from Tavis v. Higgins, supra. 
III. 
THE 1894 SURVEY OF THE WEBER RIVER, AS THEN LOCATED DUE TO 
AVULSIVE CHANGE, DID NOT AND COULD NOT ESTABLISH A BOUNDARY LINE 
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTIES DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED 
BY THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE ON JANUARY 10, 1866. 
None of the U.S. Surveys running north along the west line 
of Section 25 revealed either an abandoned (or live) river channel 
until 22.60 chains (1,49106 feet)-- a minor channel only 26.4 feet 
wide, and dry in 1871 and 1886-- or the main channel of the Weber 
River, as shown on all three surveys, at 34.5 chains (2,277 feet). 
There have been no surveys conducted by the U.S. Surveyor General 
since June 28, 1886. 
The surveyors of the two counties conducted a survey of the 
boundary line as they perceived it to be, in 1894. The survey was 
conducted in two parts: first, starting at a point on the Weber 
River north of Kingstons Fort (located approximately three miles 
westerly of the subject property) and running west to the shore of 
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the Great Salt Lake-- the boundary being monumented at inter-
vals-- and, second, a reverse survey running easterly up the 
Weber River and terminating in Weber Canyon—consisting only of 
bearing-and-distance courses of the f,Meanderings of (the) Weber 
River.11 The second portion of the survey was not monumented at any 
point (See Exh. D-2). 
The 1894 survey, for the first time, found the Weber River flow-
ing across the west line of Section 25 at a point only 715 feet 
north of the SW corner of Section 25. Further, the survey courses 
placed the Weber River on the south side of the subject property in 
1894. 
Earl H. Kendell, a life-long resident of the area, testified 
that for many years he and his brother and father operated a high-
way gas station and store, known as Kendellfs Service, at what be-
came the junction of Highway 30 and 89 when Highway 89 was extended 
across the general area from south-to-north along the general 
direction of the west line of Section 25 sometime in the early 1940s 
(Tr. 115-119--R. 668-672). He pointed out that the old channel of 
the Weber River forked and ran on both sides of their store and that 
the abandoned river channel was visible on the south side of their 
store, and elsewhere nearby (Tr. 133--R.686). 
He further testified that from the time he was a young boy there 
was a large diversion dike which had been constructed across 
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the Weber River just below the mouth of Weber Canyon (Tr. 121—R. 674). 
The dike began on a bend of the river at the foot of the hillside 
below the railroad tracks, and it extended southwesterly for about 
1,000 feet, diverting the river in a southwesterly direction (Tr. 
121-123--R.674-676). A headgate was placed in the dike so as to 
divert irrigation water from the river and into the old river channel, 
where it flowed until taken out downstream to irrigate farm lands in 
Uintah (Tr. 123-124--R. 676-677). 
Mr. Kendell stated that his grandfather, who was born in 1866, 
told him that he helped to build the rock-wall dike at a time when he 
was a ngood-sized boy, or older--" a logical time frame which would 
fit between 1886-1984 (Tr. 124-128--R.677-681). 
The existing rock dike was sketched on the detail of Utah High-
way Department road-construction plans in the year 1927 (Exhs. P-18 
and D-25), and a pre-1927 road leading up-river into Weber Canyon 
hugged the hillside at the northeasterly end of the dike. The diver-
sion dike at the point where the irrigation ditch diversion headgate 
was installed was located approximately 1,500 feet North and 2,000 
feet East of the SW corner of Section 25-- precisely in line with 
the river channel as surveyed in 1894 and as it and the southwesterly 
remnant of the rock dike exists today (Cf. Exh. D-4). 
It is interesting to note that the 1927 construction plans for 
the new highway, which ran northwesterly alongside the old river 
channel, provided for a protective barrier at Station 342 (approxi-
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mately 1,200 feet northeasterly of the rock dike) where evidence 
of the old channel had shifted to the south: 
lfSTA.342 PROVIDE DYKE ACROSS OLD CHANNEL 300 C.Y. 
UNCLASSIFIED BORROW11 
Mr. Kendell testified that the Weber River breached the dike 
during the flood of 1952, coursed down its old channel and ran on 
both sides of the Kendell store (Tr. 128-132--R.681-685; and Exhs. 
P-13 and P-14). 
Although the channel change tohich occurred between 1886 and 
1234 appears to have been associated with irrigation activities and/ 
or construction and maintenance of the pre-1927 highway which ran 
fro*n Ogdcn up to the mouth of Weber Canyon, it was unnecessary to 
pinpoint the exact reason for the channel change. Whether due to 
natural causes or man-made actiohs, an avulsive change did in fact 
occur, but the original boundary line between the two counties did 
not change. 
It appears obvious that the surveyors who made the 1894 survey 
intended and did nothing more than to run a survey of the river 
where it was then located. They made no attempt to survey the bound-
ary line between the two counties in the area of the subject property 
as it was established by the legislature; in fact, there is nothing 
in the survey notes or otherwise suggesting that they were attempting 
to resolve any uncertainty or dispute involving the common boundary 
or that they were instructed to locate a disputed or uncertain 
boundary. 
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The 1894 survey was pursued primarily by Davis County to 
assist mapmaker E.A. Vail in preparing a county-wide map lf of 
Davis County, showing School District and Precinct lines,... 
(being) in Atlas or book form... to show the Roads of the County, 
... all lublic Streams,...ff (Exh. D--3, excerpted from pp.449 
and 451). It would appear that no prior survey of the common 
boundary line had been attempted by the two counties and that the 
Weber County surveyor participated in the joint effort to per-
manently locate the boundary, but there is absolutely no evidence 
that either county participated in the survey for the purpose of 
resolving a then-existing boundary-line dispute or uncertainty'-
and none can be found. It is conceivable that a few minor problems 
may have arisen by 1894 whereby the boundary-line location would 
have been a factor, but the rocky and gravelly land which comprised 
almost all of the SW% of Section 25 must have been deemed almost 
economically worthless at that time. 
For whatever value the 1894 survey may have served, the plain 
fact remains that neither county ratified or accepted the survey 
in the area of the subject property as establishing the boundary 
line. In 1904, some 10 years later, the Weber County Commissioners 
met with representatives of Davis County and other counties in an 
attempt to resolve boundary problems, but the effort ended on a 
sour note (Exh. P-19). Davis County, for its parr, refused to 
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accept the survey inasmuch as it continued to tax those lands 
located south of the Weber River as it existed in 1866-- as this 
litigation aptly demonstrates (Ref. Exh. P-7). 
Sec. 86.2 Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, effective as of Feb.20, 
1978, provided a procedure whereby boundary disputes between counties 
could be determined by the respective surveyors where an uncertainty 
or dispute might exist (See Addendum VIII). However, the statute 
narrowly limited their authority in the following language: 
Nothing in this act shall be construed to give the 
surveyors, mentioned herein, any further authority 
than to erect suitable monuments to designate said 
boundaries as they are now established by law. 
( Underlining added) 
The statute was defective on its face for the reason that it 
imposed upon the surveyors the necessity of making legal decisions 
in instances such as illustrated in this case. The constitutional 
invnsion of the doctrine of separation of powers and the built-in 
risks of violating vested property rights under the Fifth Amendment 
and intruding upon constitutional guarantees of procedural due 
process is clearly evident. Even if a boundary dispute or uncertain-
ty can be approached factually, as it is submitted the boundary 
determination in this matter could have been had the surveyors 
been assigned to locate the 1866 boundary line, the Utah cases of 
Barton v. Sanpete County and Summit County v. Rich County make it 
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abundantly clear that their duty would have been circumscribed by 
locating the main channel of the Weber River as it existed in 
1866. Neither the legislature nor the surveyors can deviate 
from that mandate. 
It is also significant to note that in making the 1894 survey 
the surveyors erected numerous monuments proceeding west from King-
stons Fort, but in their survey going east and up the Weber River 
they did not erect a single monument. In his Memorandum Decision 
Judse Hyde felt that the river itself was a monument, but the 
statute provided that the surveyors should lf erect monuments^ ." 
( Underlining added) 
The 1878 statute was a make-shift law, and it is therefore 
understandable that the three Utah boundary-line line cases here-
tofore cited all chose to completely disregard surveys which were 
made in each instance purportedly pursuant to the statutory pro-
cedure. In recognition of its limitations, and as being indicative 
of the present misguided opinions of the law held by the respective 
county surveyors in this case, they filed Affidavits in support of 
UDOTfs Motion for Summary Judgment &. 294, 298 and 302) wherein 
each stated that the boundary between the two counties "since at 
least 1894" was the location of the Weber River as established by 
the 1894 survey. 
It should appear obvious that the legal conclusions in the 
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two carbon-copy Affidavits, as well as their wording and prepa-
ration, were nothing more than the work of counsel for UDOT who, 
at that stage of the proceedings, was contending that the location 
of the Weber River at the time of statehood in 1896 should deter-
mine the boundary between the two counties (R- 309). 
Judge Roth denied UDOT'S Motion for Summary Judgment based on 
the 1894 survey and its contention that it conformed to the statu-
tory procedure for resolving existing disputes or uncertainties in 
county boundaries (Addendum I). His ruling directed that the loca-
tion of the Weber River in 1866 should control. Although the Ruling 
indicated that plaintiffs should prove the facts as to the location 
cf the river in 1866, his subsequent Memorandum Decision placed the 
burden of proof on UDOT. 
The 1894 survey was not made pursuant to the 1878 statute 
providing for the resolution of disputed or uncertain county bound-
aries. The survey did nothing to resolve the basic issues in this 
case except to prove that an avulsive channel change in the location 
of the Weber River occurred sometime between 1886 and 1894. As a 
factual matter, the 1894 survey and the Vail map (Exh. D-6) were 
most likely the causative factors which were brought into focus and 
helped to create subsequent boundary-line disputes and uncertain-
ties. 
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IV. 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED PRECLUDES RESPONDENT FROM 
DENYING THE DAVIS COUNTY SOURCE OF TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
The Conclusions of Law and the Judgment entered in this 
action both recite that UDOT "is decreed to be the recorded 
owner of the subject property.11 And, since UDOT!s title must 
derive from the Warranty Deed which it received from Robert Dansie 
in 1964, (Exh. D-23), a closer inspection of that document and 
the facts and events relating to it are in order. 
The 1964 deed, which was prepared by UDOT's predecessor, 
State Road Commission of Utah, contains two specific recitations 
which appear for the first time in any title examination: (a) that 
the lands described therein were located in Weber County, rather 
than in Davis County, and (b) that Dansie was the owner of the 
entire 24.41 acres contained in the legal description. The record 
and the evidence fail to support either claim. 
In addition to the prior arguments set forth in this Brief, 
it should be noted that UDOT took the May 14, 1964 deed to the Davis 
County Recorder to be recorded, which was done on June 17, 1964. How-
ever, Davis County refused to enter on its records that portion of the 
legal description which was shown as being in ff Weber County,lf and 
only changed the ownership on its plat maps and records to the small 
portion of the description-- only 0.87 acre-- set forth in the deed 
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ac being in Davis County (Exh. D -23). The Davis County 
Recorder was simply complying with long-established procedures and 
ownership records in her possession. The deed was thereupon taken 
to Weber County to be recorded, but once again it was rejected until 
1970, when it was finally recorded (R- 318). 
It is highly unlikely that the Weber County Recorder "held" 
the deed for a period of six years; rather it seems more likely 
that it was returned to UDOT or its predecessor. At any rate, since the 
the format of the deed appears to be flawless, the only logical 
conclusion which can be accepted for denying recordation are that 
one or all of the following defects were present: the described 
lands were not shown on the records and maps as being in Weber 
County; or the legal description of the lands did not conform to 
prior descriptions in the chain cf title, such as might have exist-
ed in Weber County; or that the Weber County maps and records did 
not show Dansie to be the owner of the described lands. It should 
be obvious at this point that all three defects existed. 
We do not know what prompted Weber County to ultimately accept 
for recording the deed which it !fheldff for six years. In any event, 
after a lapse of another five years-- during which interval UDOT 
was aware that there were other claimants to the property-- UDOT's 
counsel in this case once again took the deed to the Davis County 
Recorder to have it recorded. However, in order to have it accepted, 
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counsel erased "Weber County11 on the two-part description and 
substituted "Davis County" in its place, thereby reciting that 
all of the described lands were in Davis County. The deed was 
recorded in Davis County for the second time on March 31, 1975 
(Exh. P-12 and Addendum IX). 
An examination of the record in this case reveals a conspic-
uous absence of exhibits or other believable evidence indicating 
a. Weber County source of title to the subject property. Davis 
County kept old plat maps (Exh. P-7) and there is a Davis County 
chain of title, but documents of any kind which even remotely tie the 
subject property to Weber County are either non-existent or, at 
best, very vague. The lack of Weber County documentary support and 
the refusal to record UDOT's deed from Dansie would raise red flags 
in front of any astute title examiner. 
When Judge Gould ordered that Weber County and Davis County 
be made parties to the lawsuit, Baxters moved for the addition of 
Monroe, Inc. as an additional party as the successor-in-interest to 
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Co. (R. 162-169). An examination of 
Exh. P-7 reveals that Utah Sand & Gravel Products Co, owned the land 
in the Si; of the SW^ ; of Section 25 immediately adjacent to, and soiith 
of, the 18-acre tract sold at tax sale to plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter 
and his two co-purchasers. Judge Gould denied the motion to include 
that property owner in the litigation. 
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The Affidavit of Stephen M. Smith, manager of the real 
property department of Monroe, stated that approximately eight (8) 
acres of Utah Sand & Gravel lands lie north of the center-line of 
the channel of the Weber River as it now exists, that its deed to 
that land extended back to 1945 and that it was recorded with the 
County'Recorder of Davis County, that real property taxes were paid 
each year since 1945 to Davis County on its lands (including the 
eight acres located north of the river), that UDOT"s deed from 
Dansie conflicted with Monroe's ownership of the land located north 
of the Weber River, that Weber County never taxed the eight acres 
located north of the river, and that UDOT has illegally trespassed 
OR said u-ands and, based upon information and belief, claims title 
to them (R.258-259). 
In short, the 1964 deed prepared by the State Road Commission 
of Utah, and signed by Dansie, contained a 24.41-acre blunder which 
UDOT is now attempting to circumvent by every imaginable defense. 
That deed included the 18 acres sold by Tax Deed to Baxters and 
their predecessors, as well as 6,41 acres, more or less, belonging 
to Monroe, Inc.-- all located in Davis County notwithstanding the 
avulsive channel change which occurred between 1886 and 1894. 
The record in this litigation is devoid of any indication 
that a Weber County chain of title exists for the subject property. 
On the other hand, there is a Davis County chain of title. On 
page 43 of this brief there appears a chronological listing of 
-42-
CNAIN-OE-TITLE ANALYSIS 
1936 Weber County Tax Deed 
(R. U02— Complaint) 
1938 Davis County Quit Claim Tax Deed 
( R. U02—: Complaint) and R. UOii 
TASMA P. DANSIE 
I Tasma P. Dansie v. 
|Hachmeister, et al. 
( R. U01--Complaint)| 
[Quiet Title Action 
-— I 
I 
I 
DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
(R. U0£ >, dated 3/26/46 
--subject land described as being in Davis County. 
I 
i 
Tasmn P. Dansie 
( Warranty Deed 3/10/61; rec. 4/22/64 
in Davis County) (R. I4.O9) 
( 
I 
ROBERT REES DANSIE ( and wife) 
/ \ 
tntr P^ r.d Con 
-JO-
yn of fjtnh 
dated 5/14/64; rec.. 3/31/75 
in Davis County-- Warranty Deed 
Note: Subject land included 
in desc. as being located in 
Davis County (K)ch. P-12) 
-via-
DAVIS COUNTY 
Tax Sale: Non-payment of 
1964 real property taxes 
DAVIS COUNTY TAX DEED —dated 5/26/69 
J (Exh.f^) Recorded 5/26/69 
t 
Ronald A. Toone (1/3), RONALD BAXTER (1/3), Thomas Hollbere ( 1/3) 
( and wife) ( 18 acres total) ( and wife) 
Q.VC. Deed 9/29/70 
^ ( E x h . P-5) 
( SubjectMand) 
6 acres N x 
-to-
1 
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd. 
Q. «C. Deed 9/74/69 j ( Exh. P-3) 
-to-
(Subject land } , ' 
6 acres ' 
Deed (9/25/7i> 
( Exh. P-U) 
RONALD A. and SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER Ht) 
( 6 acres) 
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those documents material to this litigation, covering the time 
frame since 1938. Every document in the chain of title which 
includes the subject property recites that the land is located in 
Ifevis County, except for the maverick deed from Dansie to State 
Road Commission of Utah, dated May 14, 1964 and reciting that the 
property was located in Weber County-- until UDOT's counsel subse-
quently altered it in 1975 to show its location to be in Davis 
County. 
In addition to fortifying Baxter's claim that the subject 
property is physically located in Davis County, the documents in 
the chain of title establish an alternative and independent legal 
basis which supports their position under the doctrine of estoppel 
by deed. 
Estoppel by deed applies to conveyances in the chain of title 
to real property in different circumstances and conditions, but, as 
applied to the facts of this case wherein the critical deviation in 
the documentary sequence involves a change in the recitals relating 
to county location, the law is clear-cut and to the point: Where two 
litigants claim title to the same property through a common-source 
grantor in the chain of title, both are bound by estoppel from 
denying material recitals in any conveyance issuing from the common-
source owner-grantor. 
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From Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver: 
4. Generally; definition and nature. 
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party 
to a deed and his privies from asserting as against 
the other party and his privies any right or title 
in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth 
of any material facts asserted in it, Estoppel by deed 
is technical in nature, and such an estoppel may con-
clude a party without any reference to the moral 
qualities of his conduct. 
Estoppel by deed is a very important aspect of the law 
of estoppel. By reason of the operation of this doctrine, 
particularly upon grantors of real property and upon 
the passage of after-acquired title of such grantors, 
the effect of the doctrine upon grantees, and the 
effect and extent of control of recitals in conveyances 
as an estoppel upon parties thereto and their privies, many 
important and practical questions affecting the title to 
real property are controlled to a large extent. A person 
who is examining the record title to realty should be 
able to rely on the doctrine of estoppel by deed,... 
8. Operation and effect, generally. 
Estoppels which run with the land and work thereon are 
not mere conclusions; they pass estates and constitute 
titles, and are muniments of title, assuring it to the 
purchaser. The estoppel which inures in favor of a 
grantee of land operates in favor of a purchaser from 
him; where a grantor is estopped by his deed to set up 
title against his grantee, he is likewise estopped to 
set it up against the assigns of such grantee. All 
persons claiming through the parties estopped are equally 
bound by the estoppel. An estoppel which works on an 
interest in land runs with the land into whosoever hands 
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the land comes, and privies who are bound by such estoppel 
include privies in blood and estate. However, an estoppel 
by deed is operative only between parties to the deed 
and their privies; strangers to the deed are not bound by 
nor can they invoke, the estoppel. 
C. ESTOPPEL OF GRANTEE AND PRIVIES 
13. Generally. 
•..A person cannot claim under an instrument without 
confirming it. He must found his claim on the whole, and 
cannot adopt that feature or operation which makes in his 
favor, and at the same time repudiate or contradict another 
which is counter or adverse to it. A grantor has been held 
to be estopped to enforce any claim inconsistent with the 
valid provisions of a deed. 
Footnote: A party cannot be permitted to claim both under 
and against the same deed, to insist on its 
efficacy to confer a benefit and repudiate a 
burden with which it has qualified it, or to 
affirm a part and reject a part. Gibson v. 
Lyon, 115 U.S.439, 29L.ed 440, 6 S. Ct. 129 
In other words he cannot assert that the title obtained 
from the grantor or through him is sufficient for his 
protection and not available to his contestant. It has 
been held that where one entered into the possession of land 
under and by virtue of a conveyance in fee, with covenants 
of warranty from another, and retaining that possession, 
relying upon the grant or possession under it, in aid of 
his title or possession, he cannot deny the title thus 
acquired against the grantor and those claiming under him... 
15. Claimants under common source of title. 
It is the general rule that where two parties claim under 
the same grantor, each is estopped to deny that the grantor 
had title or a right to convey. The principle has been 
stated more fully by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
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which has declared that where both parties assert title 
from a common grantor and no other source, neither can 
deny that such grantor had a valid title when he executed 
his conveyance. Moreover, it has been held that where each 
party claims under a common source, each is estopped to 
attack the title antedating the common source. 
It is now the generally accepted rule that when two 
persons derive title from a common source, one of them 
is not estopped to assert against the other a paramount 
title which he has subsequently acquired. He may even 
admit a common source, and then show that the title 
presently relied on is a paramount tax title,... 
21. Operation and effect of recitals. 
As a broad general rule, subject to the qualifications 
herein discussed, all parties to a deed and those claiming 
under them are bound by the recital of material facts 
in the deed. A recital of one deed in another or of a 
fact in a deed binds the parties and those who claim 
under them. It is an estoppel which binds parties and 
privities-- that is, privies in blood, privies in estate, 
and privies in law... 
Estoppel by deed precludes UDOT from denying that the subject 
property is located in Davis County. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment should be reversed and title to the subject 
property should be quieted in plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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ADDENDUM I 
Judge Roth's Ruling Denying: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Based upon 18?U Survey of Weber River made by County Surveyors. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. BAXTER and ] 
SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER, 
Plaintiff? 
vs. ) 
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., 
a Utah corporation, 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT REES DANSIE, MARIE GROW 
DANSIE, DAVIS COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, DAVIS COUNTY 
ASSESSOR, DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER, 
and WEBER COUNTY, a Body Politic 
of the State of Utah, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Case No. 74206 
Having heard the arguments of counse l and having 
reviewed the memoranda on f i l e r I ru le as follows: 
I-a 
Page 2 
Puling on Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Case No. 74206 
The boundary between Weber and Davis Counties was 
established by description in an Act of the legislature of the 
Utah Territory in 1866* Said description used the main channel 
of the Weber River as the boundary in the area of the subject 
property. Plaintiff contends that in 1866, the Weber River was 
north of the subject property and that the subject property was 
therefore located in Davis County. Plaintiff further contends 
that the river later altered its course by a sudden, avulsive 
action caused by either man-made or natural conditions so as to 
place the subject lands on the north side of the Weber River. 
Plaintiff argues that the law provides that where there is a 
sudden, violent change in the channel of a river that the 
boundary remains unaffected and remains in the original position 
therefor, the subject property remains in Davis County. 
This issue has not been litigated in an action including 
the parties that are presently before the Court and plaintiff 
will be allowed an opportunity to prove the facts they have 
alleqed in support of their claim. Defendants motion for 
summary judgment is denied. Plaintiff is to prepare an order 
consistent with this decision. 
DATED this ^ / day of May, 1986. 
Pages 38-1*3 from Pretrial 
ADDENDUM II Hearing before Judge Roth 
strongly than what the Court did, your Honor, The Court said 
the boundary was established by description and Mr. Fuller 
goes on to say was not only established, but was determined to 
be the main channel of the Weber River in the area of the 
subject property. He has gone just that much farther. 
And secondly, your Honor, he has gone on to further 
state what the Court then went on to say, the Plaintiffs 
contentions after that first paragraph. The Court went on and 
said Plaintiff contends, plaintiff argues, and further— 
THE COURT: You quarrel with number two as being a 
correct statement of law? 
MR. WARD: Well, I don't know it is that easy because 
there was no main channel of the Weber River. And I think to 
include that now might prejudice us later on to the effect that 
the Court has concluded there was a main channel of the Weber 
River. And we..,SAY
 %.tbeJ^J«&~not. 
THjE_cpjyRT^ _ 9k.a.y.f...£HPEose l*e a.sk t,he JurY number one, 
in 1866, can it be determined there ^was ^ a main^ channel. of ,the_ 
Weber River at the place in question, yes or no. If_y.ou_^ asw„e_rd 
yes, was that main channel north or southf_answer north or_soutIj 
Number three, wajs^there^vid^ 
south? Those three issues for the Jury. You call your experts, 
your surveyors, diagrams, maps. You do the same thing, let theirj 
decide it. 
„ MR,.. WARD:E n In essence f yes. 
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THE COURT: Okay. You agree with that? 
MR. FULLER: I agree. 
THE COURT:_ And as to who.has ^ot^the_bu£^n^ I will 
look at your pleadings and make a determination. Not just-
some things you can stipulate. I don't know if you are going 
to be in the mood to at the time for trial. Now there is a 
tax sale and tax deed. The question is still going to Joe who 
8
 |has the burden of proving whether the property is in Weber or 
Davis. You say because you have got the tax deed, the burden 
shifts? 
MR. FULLER: Because they^rajLsed^it^by ^ f^ir^^i^ye 
defense. 
THE COURT: Alright, I will look at the pleadings. 
I f vc J.__aJL 1 eged in your Complaint that you intend to prove the 
property was in Davis County^--
MR. FULLER: We did not allege that in the pleading. 
THE COURT: I will look at that and make a decision 
on that. Anything else? 
MR. WARD: Well, that's the ruling of the Court,jpn_ 
the Order pre.par.ecL by..Mr.....FuJLler? 
THE COURT: I don't t h i ^ 
the re u n s I g n e d. I w i 11 1e a ve _ it unsigned.>
 t I have decided what 
the trial will be about. 
JAR. WARD : X9,^...J£i?-1..A§£X?~JJLJftM 
THE CQURT; .J.^fta.ve,,,it..l.D>^uiaigjiiaa4 ^memoxajidjim 
Il-b 3 9 
decision is the 0 Drder, 
MR. WARD: That's fine. 
MR. HESS: Would it be appropriate to maybe get a 
transcript of what you just identified and make that—incorporate 
that into the Pre-trial Order? Is there going to be an Order 
coming forth now? 
THE COURT: A transcript of the three issues that I 
felt would be submitted to the Jury? Sure. 
case? 
MR. WARD: Who made the request for Jury trial in this 
THE COURT: You did. 
MR. FULLER: I think both sides probably did. 
MR. WARD: Is it too late ,to withdraw _our„rgayest? 
THE COURT: Not if you haven't paid for it. 
MR. WARD: We don't pay anyway. 
MR. 
THE 
. MR ._ 
MR. 
your Honor. : 
entitled to a 
time. 
MR. 
THE 
jury won't be 
FULLER: I think Mr. Baxter Jbrought_up>_a juror fee 
COURT: You have jmade ,a regu^st^a.nd^pAl^.a^fe,e? 
^FULLER: . Y e s . 
WARD: We withdraw the request at this time, 
rf Mr. Fuller wants to pay the fee, 1 guess he is 
jury trial. _But_wg, withdraw our request at this 
FULLER: I am sure it has been paid. 
COURT: You better check. If it hasn't, the 
here. When is the trial? 
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MR. WARD: August 20—where is my book. 
MR. HESS: 25th. 
MR. FULLER: I think that's right. 9:30 a.m., that's 
in the proposed Order. 
THE COU:^. The 25th? 
MR. FULLER: The 25th. 
THE COURT: That's a Monday, that's my law and motion 
day. 
MR. WARD: No, it is not the 25th, the 26th and 27th. 
MR. FULLER: I think Jerry did give us the 25th. 
MR. WARD: I have the 26th and 27th. 
THE COURT: That's more likely. 
MR. WARD: Tuesday the 26th. Here is a notice of tria 
setting signed by Jerry Jensen. 
MR. FULLER: Tuesday the 26th. 
THE COURT: Anything else? Alright— 
MR. HESS: Well, is there going to be a' pre-trial 
Order, you know, as far as the date and time and the issues? 
1 guess I am just interested to get down that Davis^ County 
will not b e _ h ^ 
MR. WARD: That's correct. 
THE COURT: We haven't even gotten to witnesses or 
c::changing names of witnesses. 
MR. WARD: Mr. Fuller has already indicated who his 
witnesses are, and I think I have indicated, not formally, but 
Q. 
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informally. He never asked, but I have told him who my witnessed 
are . 
THE COURT: How many will you have. Mr. Fuller? 
MR. FULLER: I think we will have four. 
THE COURT: Four witnesses? 
MR. FULLER: I think. 
MR. WARD: He has listed Ron Baxter, Jay Anderson, 
Geraldine Page and Earl Kendell. 
THE COURT: And how many will you have? 
MR. WARD: I haven't added them up. The Weber County 
Surveyor, the Davis County Surveyor, the Davis County Assessor. 
The Davis County Recorder, the Davis County Cier, and Jack De 
Moss, Nick Butcovich and maybe Joe Varoz. 
THE COURT: Two days going to be enough? 
MR. WARD: Probably. I don't know if the Court would 
allow a viewing. 
THE COURT: I don't know if a pre-trial Order is 
necessary. Maybe it should be. It will show that defendants 
agreed that they are not proceeding on
 Mtheir counterclaim_ag_ains 
Davis County, that Davis and Weber County will remain as parties 
to the action, a^j^^between_t^_tj^^counties, wi^ ll^  be.vbpupd 
by the decision of the Jury. But that no other parties are, 
bound that are not present. 
You want it to show that Davis and Weber Counties will not 
Il-e 42 
Pretty much a gentleman's, agreement at this point, but I am not 
sure I can do that and have you bound by the decision. I will 
leave it up to you. The Court is here, the Jury will be here, 
the forum is available. If you want to jump in and take a side 
one way or another, you can do it. If you don't want to--
MR. HESS: Well, I think that our people, both Weber 
and Davis, are going to be involved as witnesses, so probably 
just vith the understanding here that as the Court has outlined 
I don't know it needs to be formalized. 
THE COURT: Three questions will be presented to the 
Jury, at least it is anticipated that_ three guestions ^ will be. 
Number 1, is it possible to determine the location of_the_main 
channel of the Weber River in 1866 as it applies to the property 
in question? If the answer to that is yes, then they go to the 
next question. If the answer is ,no, the tria1 of oyer. 
Question number 2, is that main channel north or south of 
the property in question. If the answer is north, then was therje 
a sudden—whatever the language is. 
MR. WARD: Violent evulsive change. 
THE COURT: Whatever. I just^had in_my_memqra^^ 
sudden shift in the channel to its present location^ or some 
location south of the property in Question. 
MR. FULLER: Would it be appropriate to have an 
Instruction for the jury as to the position of the two counties 
in the case? I would think so, that they,r§^ree^to^be bound_by 
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ADDENDUM III 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. BAXTER and ] 
SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., ] 
a Utah corporation, 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, ] 
Defendant and ' 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
ROBERT REES DANSIE, MARIE GROW ' 
DANSIE, DAVIS COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, DAVIS COUNTY 
ASSESSOR, DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER, ] 
and WEBER COUNTY, a Body Politic ] 
of the State ot Utah, 
Third-Party Defendants. ' 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i Case No. 74206 
The question presented in this case is: Where was the 
Weber River in 1866• The boundary between Weber and Davis County 
was established by description in an act of the legislature of 
Utah Territory in 1866. The description used the roain cnannel ot 
Ill-a 
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Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 74206 
the Weber River as the boundary in the area of the subject 
property. It is the contention of the plaintiff that in 1866 the 
Weber River was north of the subject property, and the property 
was, therefore, located in Davis County. Plaintiff further 
contends the river later altered its course by sudden avulsive 
action caused by either man-made or natural conditions, so that 
the subject property lands on the north side of the Weber River. 
Plaintiff relies primarily upon three surveys: One in 
1855; one in 1877; and a third in 1886. These surveys are ot the 
west border of Section 25. The notes of these surveys show the 
river crossing the west boundary of the section at different 
locations, but primarily north of the subject property. The 
problem with this is that it does not show where the river was, 
say, 50 feet east of the border. It becomes even further confus-
ing, for example, both Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 and Derendant's 
Exhibit 7 are plat maps and show the river somewhat north. 
However, when you take Defendant's Exhibit 8, which is Section 26 
bordering 25, the locations of the river are far off, and the 
plat map in 26 shows the river crossing the border far south ot 
what the plat map in Plaintiff's and Defendant's Exhibit 7 
shows. Admittedly, these plat maps are just that, and are 
undated, but they do show the confusion in regard to the actual 
location ot the Weber River. 
Ill-b 
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Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 74206 
Tne engineers called as witnesses, when asked a direct 
question: "Can you tell us where the Weber River was in 1866?" 
would answer, "No". No one channel is shownf nothing is 
definitive. 
It appears that in about 1894
 f the surveyor of Davis 
County and a deputy surveyor in Weber County surveyed the river. 
Their survey shows the river to be, for all intents and purposes, 
where it is today. This survey was done under a statute that 
states whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall rise as to any 
county boundaryf the same may be determined by the county 
surveyors ot the counties interested. This appears to be wnat 
the 1894 survey between the two county surveyors was. Plaintiff 
contends that surveyors can only erect monuments, and that they 
cannot designate or agree upon the boundaries. No evidence that 
they did anything other than survey in order to clarify the 
uncertainty. As for the non-erection of monuments as suchf the 
evidence indicates monuments are not generally erected along a 
river, because a river is generally a monument. 
I hold that the pjep^de£c^j^j^^^ 
a n e
*
a c t
 location of the river in 1866 cannot be placed. It 
appears that the river, like the proverbial big gorilla, went 
wherever it wanted to. The 1855, f71, and f86 surveys of the 
west section line indicate primarily that the course of the river 
was subject to change. There is no evidence to show that the 
III-c 
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river changed its course by a sudden, avulsive action, so as to 
leave property north of the river in Davis County* I further 
hold that there was definitely an uncertainty as to the location 
of the river, which caused an uncertainty as to the county 
boundary, and pursuant to this statute, _thi^ uncertainty^ may be 
determined by county surveyors and this was done in 1894, and 
that that survey established the boundary between the counties. 
That survey was just that, a survey of the location of the river, 
and there is certainly no evidence to indicate that the surveyors 
made any changes in the river, or did anything other _ than just 
survey the river bv metes and bounds. The 1894 survey set the 
river definitely. There being no prior surveys of the river 
itself, to place the river in a location other than the,_1894 
survey is_just speculation. 
« * — ' " ' " " " ^ • - « • — — — . — • - -
I, therefore, hold that the boundary between Davis and 
Weber Counties being the main channel of the Weber River is as 
the 1894 survey place the river, which description basically 
coincides with the present location of the Weber River. 
The subject property is and has been in Weber County. 
The sale by Davis County was invalid and of no effect whatso-
ever* Plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to have the title ot 
the real property quieted as against defendants. 
Ill-d 
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Detendant to prepare findingsf conclusions and judgment 
in accordance herewith. 
DATED this .5 day of September, 1986. 
SXLD" 0. HYDE, lC RON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this o day of September, 
1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision was served upon the following: 
Stephen C. Ward 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Utah Department 
of Transportation 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
245 North Vine Street #608 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Gerald E. Hess 
Assistant Davis County Attorney 
Attorney for Davis County 
County Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Brent E. Johns 
Assistant Weber County Attorney 
Attorney for Weber County 
7th floorf Municipal Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
I l l - e 
PASliA CARR, Secretary 
ADDENDUM IV 
DAVID L . WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DONALD S. COLEMAN - Bar No. 0695 
Chief, Phys ica l Resources D iv i s ion 
STEPHEN C. WARD - Bar No. 3384 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
124 S t a t e Cap i to l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-66 84 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. BAXTER and SHIRLEY 
DIANE BAXTER, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs ax3 
Appellants, 
vs. 
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., a 
Utah Corporation, 
An Involuntary 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant, Third-
Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
vs. 
•ROBERT REES DANS IE and MARIE 
GROW DANSIE, h i s w i f e ; DAVIS 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l No. 74206 
IV-a 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS 
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER 
COUNTY, a Body Politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on the 26th day of August, 
1986. The Plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Glen E. Fuller, the 
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation was represented by 
Mr. Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, the Defendant 
Weber County was represented by Mr. Brent E. Johns, Assistant 
Weber County Attorney, and the Davis County Defendants were rep-
resented by Mr. Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis County Attorney. 
Testimony and evidence was adduced by both parties in 
regard to the issues formed for hearing and trial, namely the 
location of the boundary between Davis and Weber Counties. The 
Court having received and considered testimony from various 
witnesses as well as considering the memoranda and oral arguments 
and thereupon taken the matter under advisement and being now 
fully advised in all and singular the law and facts in the 
premises, does now make and adopt its Findings of Fact. 
-2-
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The boundary between Weber and Davis Counties was 
established by description in an act of the legislature of the 
Utah Territory in 1866. 
2. The description used the main channel of the Weber 
River as the boundary in the area of the subject property. 
3. Three surveys were made along the west border of 
IBS-^ 187/ 
Section 25 in the years of 1885/ 1877 and 1886. These three 
surveys show the river crossing the west boundary of the section 
a t
 different locations. 
4. These three surveys referred to in the preceeding 
paragraphs did not describe the location of the river east of the 
section line. 
5. That in 1894 the surveyors of Davis and Weber 
Counties surveyed the location of the Weber River. The survey 
described the River for all intents and purposes, where it is 
today. 
6. The survey was done under statute that states 
wherein amy dispute or jincertainty shajl arise^as to any county 
boundary, the same may be determined by the county surveyors of 
the interested counties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The preponderance of evidence shows that an exact 
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location of the Weber River in 1866 cannot be determined. 
2. The prior surveys indicates that the Weber River 
was subject to change. 
3. The Plaintiff failed to prove by preponderance of 
evidence that the Weber changed its course by a sudden avulsive 
actionf so as to leave the property north of the river in Davis 
County. 
4. That a definite unnertaintv existed as to the 
location of the Weber River, which caused an uncertainty as to 
the county boundary, and pursuant to statute, this uncertainty 
may be determined by county surveyors and was done in 1894, and 
that survey established the boundary between the two counties. 
5. The 1894 survey established the boundary between 
Weber and Davis Counties as the main channel of the Weber River 
and the county boundary has remained the location of the Weber 
River up to the present time. 
6. The subject property, the description of which is 
as follows: 
A portion of the South h of the North h of the 
Southwest h of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Beginning at a point which is N. 33°42f W. 1571.1 
feet and N. 89°48 W. 275.34 feet from the South h 
Corner of Section 25, Township 5, North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence: N. 89°48f W. 826.78 feet along the h Section 
-4-
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l i n e of sa id Sect ion 25 , thence North 412.88 f e e t 
t o the e x i s t i n g highway I-80-N right-of-way l i n e , 
thence S. 80°03 l E. 697.00 f e e t along s a i d highway 
right-of-way l i n e t o the West right-of-way l i n e of 
Weber Basin Aqueduct, S tat ion 45+83.51 , thence 
S. 43°13 l E. 133.51 f e e t along sa id aqueduct r i g h t -
of-way l i n e , thence S. 46°47 f W. 100.00 f e e t along 
sa id aqueduct right-of-way l i n e , thence S. 43°13' E. 
177.78 f e e t along s a i d r ight-of-way l i n e t o the point 
of beginning. 
Containing 6.00 acres . 
i s and ha.s always been inJWeber county. 
7 . The tax s a l e conducted on the subject property was 
i n v a l i d and of no e f f e c t whatsoever. 
8 . The P l a i n t i f f i s , there fore , not e n t i t l e d t o have 
the t i t l e to the property which i s the subjec t matter of t h i s 
lawsui t and be quieted as against these Defendants. 
9 . That the Defendant Utah Department of Transporta-
t i o n i s the recorded owner of the subject property. 
DATED t h i s fc> day of September, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
?/</ c(f>nj4sl<l (y. yj*yc/^ 
RONALD 0 . HYDE 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
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ADDENDUM V 
DAVID L . WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
DONALD S . COLEMAN - Bar No. 0695 
Chief , P h y s i c a l R e s o u r c e s D i v i s i o n 
STEPHEN C. WARD - Bar No. 33 84 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
124 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y r U t a h 84114 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 533-6684 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. BAXTER and SHIRLEY : 
DIANE BAXTER, h u s b a n d and 
w i f e , : 
P l a i n t i f f s and : 
A p p e l l a n t s , 
v s . 
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD. , a 
Utah C o r p o r a t i o n , 
An I n v o l u n t a r y 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant, Third-
Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
ROBERT REES DANSIE and MARIE 
GROW DANSIE, his wife; DAVIS 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS 
Civil No. 74206 
V-a 
CODNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS 
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER 
COUNTY, a Body Politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on the 26th day of August, 
1986. The Plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Glen E. Fuller, the 
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation was represented by 
Mr. Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, the Defendant 
Weber County was represented by Mr. Brent E. Johns, Assistant 
Weber County Attorney, and the Davis County Defendants were rep-
resented by Mr. Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis County Attorney. 
The Court after making its Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law hereby makes and enters the following Judgment: 
1. That the following described tract of property is 
and has always been in Weber County, State of Utah: 
A portion of the South h of the North h of the 
Southwest h of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Beginning at a point which is N. 33°42f W. 1571.1 
feet and N. 89°48f W. 275.34 feet from the South h 
Corner of Section 25, Township 5, North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
-2-
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thence: N. 89°48f W. 826.78 feet along the h Section 
line of said Section 25, thence North 412*88 feet 
to the existing highway I-8Q-N right-of-way line, 
thence S. 80°03l E. 697.00 feet along said highway 
right-of-way line to the West right-of-way line of 
Weber Basin Aqueduct, Station 45+83.51, thence 
S. 43°13l E. 133.51 feet along said aqueduct right-
of-way line, thence S. 46°47l W. 100.00 feet along 
said aqueduct right-of-way line, thence S. 43°13' E. 
177.78 feet along said right-of-way line to the 
point of beginning. Containing 6.00 acres. 
2. That the tax sale wherein the Plaintiffs purchased 
the subject property from Davis County was involved is of no 
effect whatsoever. 
3. The Defendant Utah Department of Transportation is 
decreed to be the recorded owner of the subject property. 
4. That the Plaintiffs have no interest whatsoever in 
the subject property. j Qc^^r 
DATED this "^ day of Scplemfeer, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
RONALD 6. HYDE ~j/ 
District Judge 
-3-
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ADDENDUM VI 
Bccerpts fron Certified Copies of Field Notes of Official 
U# S, Surveys of West Line of Section 2$—Exhs. P-15, P-16 
and P-17. Surveys made in 1855, 1871 and 1886. 
DEC 1 2 1975 
CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE A! 'D EXACT COPY OF TH* 
ORIGINAL OK i-\H !.v v: : ; ! ; • -. : ; - • • : :
 c .- " 
SALT LAI-:- CITY, \JIA\I 
RE POUT: 
^Examined 
Transcribed 
, Compared \ 
1 FIELD NOTES 
O F TK^J&TJI^"V"E-Y" O F THEE 
?Z^t?^<£^ 
or 
Township JVo. 
Range No. ... < (•^T^x^C^ 
OF THE 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN 
IN 
UTAH TERRITORY, 
AS SUR> 
U. S. Deputy Surveyor, s* 
J$~ Under his Qohtraet No.. 
Dated.. ( ^ y ^ r ^ ^ t f ^ ^188<$ 
Survey Commenced %&<&<&>&&i<' 886 
Survey Completed " <!%&,.1881 
VT-fl 
1886 Survey 
/ / 
M 
lea 
Ut 
•^ >l 
" ^ C ^ ^ J " &L ~<£<yrK Ji~ 
OK-A-219 
A J^ (tfir.Ct•$/#. 
At-
<yj&tz£6LdJ 
tQ^ JZ/*Z~ a/ efaxd/ d&yuj S<cT%, 
\/& <?*; %/ <j/cuu/ cutoO Tttc<u^4, 
W-M. 
V/000 
&d/.'.£sdL 
/• WCA» ztrtdu 3,, 
s/Orru/ 
d/ena&ta*) ( dead) dw>u> ^/LUja ) T 
xrr _v 
1871 Survey 
'
3
"'U <A~r, . ^ ^ v ^ J I ^ , i 
^u/.<^:r.^- /-
—' • T ' ' ' /*i 
& * ' . #< 
br&t^^w. y*/ j? 
•'
e
*f*~*f 
- - / - - I S * 
\$lZ:.J?.i.- r ^ * /*w»*jf ^fe» »•*«•**• K / y k JC >^* 
I 5?y A~M£ A*~0** &*..&-: 
/t^jf **&<'* * » * . » *.. *t~yi,,'.+ „ , </S/'._ 
/- / «.-
j '"Si*. ; /jr*s* ' C , 
T7T_ -
1855 Survey 
B 
. , : . ..„._.^,.,....-v.. , / . . ., , . „ . . , . . _ , 
/£ fo OZ &* <a. 
<2t.W oZ£ fort- jftU&j*£ 
faff *& V W ^ /^- /ftlflflt fesvvmf .. «£st> 
f;^k&aJ-. t>u. /?7tin+*f.rt tjr finises. 
aJ- fry. rf 4?&fa, Jr. 46 
i . - , i J t - ' J . -~-~~-rw ,i„. .,i ....... - T . ^ y , . . , ! . ^ ..,.. . . — • / • • . . , I- • 
«&*>, J* jfarf' *f &*>? dfeft-dtpi s&A* 
ADDENDUM VII 
EXHIBIT D-16 
1886 Map of portion of Section 
2$ prepared by Surveyor General 
"strictly conformable"to the 
field notes" of the U. S. Survey. 
Location of Subject Property 
(Superimposed in red) 
T 7 * r^Jm^^^L 3 ; . ^ X f e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ 
UNITED STATED 
V I I - a DEPARtiiENT OF THE WKERIOR 
Burtttb of Land Martl^ment 
Utah State Office 
University Club Buijding 
136 E. So. Temple 
Salt Uke Gity. Utah 84111 
t hereby certify that this w * * ^ 
ADDENDUU VIII 
BOUNDARY-LINE DISPUTE STATUTE 
Sec. 86.2 COMPILED UV;S of Utah 
1888, effective as of Feb. 20, 10 fo 
Sec. 86,2 Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall arise as 
to any county boundary, the same may be determined by the 
county surveyors of the counties interested, and in case they 
fail to agree, or otherwise fail to establish the boundary, 
the county courts of either or both counties interested, may 
engage the services of the aforesaid Territorial Commissioner, 
who, with the said county surveyors, or either of them, if but 
one appear for that purpose, shall proceed forthwith to 
permanently determine such boundary line at the expense of the 
counties interested by making the necessary surveys and erecting 
suitable monuments to designate said boundaries, which shall be 
deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment. 
Nothings in this act shall be construed to give the surveyors, 
mentioned herein, any further authority than to erect suitable 
monuments to designate said boundaries as they are now established 
by law.(l)fl 
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Parcel No. 80N-6:l6:H5 Harrantg 9»*i> £ £ . « £ : 6(4)51 
I 
Robert Rees Dansle & Marie Grow Dansie, his wife • Grantors.., 
of Murray9 County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
hcret^eonvcy and warranty to the STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF UTAH, Grantee, for the sum of 
Seven M t B a o , Five Hundred and Eighty-four and no/lOOths Dollars, " 
the following described parcel of land in Davis and Weber County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Two parcels of land In fee for a freeway known as Project No* 80N-6, being 
part of an entire tract of property, In the SWi of Section 25, T. 5. N.f R. 1 W „ 
S.L.B.&M. The boundaries of said parcel of land ere described as follows: 
C#&> IN DAVIS COUNTY: 
Beginning on the west line of said Section 25 at a point 145.7 ft, radially 
distant southerly from the center line of said project, which point Is approx-
imately 3^56 ft* southerly from the NW. corner of said Section 25; thence S. 88° 
2kl E. 536.17 ft. to a point 120.0 ft. perpendicularly distant southerly from . 
said center line at Engineer Station 51+18.27; thence S. 80* 031 E. 1481.73 ft.; 
thence S. 49* 05* £• 85 ft., more or less, to the center of.the Weber River; 
thence Southwesterly 2200 ft., more or less, along the center of said river to 
the west line of said Section 25; thence Northerly 980 ft., more or less, to the 
point of beginning •% shown on the official map of said project on file In the 
office of the State Road Commission of Utah. The above described parcel contains 
24.41 acres, more or less. 
ALSO IN DAVIS COUNTY: 
Beginning on the south line of the NE£ SVf£ of said Section 25 at a point 
240.0 ft. perpendicularly distant southerly from the center line of said project, 
which point is approximately 300 ft. westerly from the SE. corner of said NE$ 
SV£; thence N. 80# 03' W. 200 ft., more or less, to a point 240.0 ft. perpendic-
ularly distant southerly from said center line at Engineer Station 68+00; thence 
N. 49* 05• W. 150 ft., more or less, to the center of the Weber River; thence 
Southwesterly 3$8 ft., more or less, along the center of said river to the south 
line of said NE£ SWj; thence Easterly 640 ft., more or less, along said south 
line to the point of beginning as shown on the official map of said project on 
file in the office of the State Road Commission of Utah. The above described 
parcel of land contains 0.87 acre, more or less. 
NOTE: This deed is subject to a U.S.A. pipe line Easement (501-242) Weber 
Aqueduct.. 
Any and all water rights pertaining to the above described land are hereby 
reserved by the grantor, and the grantee shall not be liable for any water 
assessments now dum or which shall become due. 
I STAfE,6^..Ttmh 
4 ^W'W^ 
May 
WITNESS,""the" bindi^'of said Grantorf_, this 
Signed in the presence of: 
—mm 
day of 
- * 
W I f V I MO wauiaoo IA><<;»,.» 
flat to Mr aw** YM mtfT,,. 
**<->' :« 1 ~—m
 mm «e tag 
itpftt 8 \$&& ' / 1 4 t h M9n0mn *W&* * Haf.' ">< •••- .A. D. 1964 • personally 
\/^Pf*^9£e^\me Robert RtflT Dansie & Marie Grow Dansie, h i s wife 
'"".• thesVgnefs_of the within inttruinent, who duly acknowledged to 
My Commission expires: 
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